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Sound global environmental policies in relation to trade do not harm global economic welfare—
they promote it. Provided appropriate compensations are paid from the gains yielded by sound 
policies, both developed and emerging countries can enjoy improved economic welfare as a 
 consequence of such policies. Both economic efficiency and equity are promoted. The argument 
is applied to mitigating global greenhouse gas emissions.
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1. InTRoDUCTIon
I conine my attention to two issues. First, I discuss the  effects of environmental policy 
 objectives on trade and welfare.  Second, I show how trade agreements can be integrated 
with environmental concerns and particularly how the production of an international trade in 
 carbon-intensive outputs can be sensibly regulated. Some of the discussion is related to China.
2. EnVIRonMEnTal THREaTS To TRaDE
Environmental concerns are seen by some as a threat to the continued growth of world trade 
particularly if trade itself  promotes environmental degradation (Tamiotti et al. 2009). This 
continued growth is seen as improving the  economic  welfare of nations so that the  pursuit 
of environmental  objectives is seen by some as restricting the range of possible trades and 
thereby impeding sought-after welfare gains. These implied losses are seen as particu-
larly important for developing countries who seek higher standards of non- environmental 
 consumption per capita and who place a relatively low valuation on the natural environment. 
This is an unsound economics. The eficiency case for inter nalizing global external costs 
is premised on  maximizing  global economic welfare. Internalizing externalities, such as 
those associated with greenhouse gas emissions (GGEs),  maximizes global welfare and, 
provided the right compensations are paid, will advantage all. This case is not  diminished by 
the fact that some countries in the  developing world might have low  willingness-to-pay for 
 environmental  quality. As is the case with respect to externalities in a closed economy with 
poor and wealthy citizens, it makes sense to  internalize external costs by attaching a uni-
form price on the externalities—or by allowing free trade in the eficient level of emissions 
 permits—and by then addressing distributional  concerns  using compensatory transfers. 
This isn’t just  abstract  economic theory. If one reviews the UN  climate change  negotiations 
in Copenhagen, it is clear that the  negotiation issues were as much about negotiating 
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 compensations and development  assistance—including tech-
nology and inancial transfers—to developing countries from 
developed countries as it was about mitigating GGEs. Indeed, 
the Copenhagen  Accord refers to mitigation actions in Articles 
2, 4 and 5 and compensation issues are addressed in Article 
8 partly via the establishment of a Copenhagen Green Climate 
Fund (Article 10) and a  Technology Mechanism ( Article 11) 
(United Nations 2009). This broad  perspective makes sense.
There are global ineficiency costs if trade expands along with 
trade-induced external costs. The global gains from trade 
can be increased with appropriate policies for addressing 
the  externalities. Given this increase and the possibility of 
 appropriate transfers, all countries can be made better off. 
This should be the starting point for thinking about global 
 environmental issues. 
This entirely elementary argument—a direct implication of the 
idea that externalities imply deadweight losses—is  disbelieved 
by many in both developing and developed  countries.  Carmody 
(2009), for example, argues that free international trade 
in GGE permits “reduce the selling country’s capacity for 
 ETS-compliant economic growth” and that “growth  capacity 
is added to the initial growth capacity of the countries  buying 
the permits”. Carmody sees revenues to permit sellers 
( developing countries) being used to buy goods from permit 
buyers (developed countries) so growth in developed countries 
occurs at “the expense of” less growth in developing  countries. 
This is an extreme variant of the thesis that eficient environ-
mental policies inevitably damage growth, and is incorrect. 
Free international trade in permits helps to ensure that clean-
up occurs at minimum global cost—it is estimated that global 
costs of GGE cleanup will be cut by 20 per cent with such trade 
(The Climate Group 2009). This eficiency might be distribu-
tionally unfair to developing countries because to achieve it, 
the costs of cleanup end up being as high in developing as 
developed countries, even though the latter have a higher 
willingness-to-pay for it. Hence the need for compensations 
to developing countries, either by assigning an initial alloca-
tion of emissions permits that remains restrictive enough to 
enforce a hefty carbon price or, conceivably, via technology 
transfer or a direct monetary transfer. Such compensations 
are feasible because eliminating the distortion increases the 
correctly-calculated value of world output. Provided the trans-
fer is large enough—whatever the speciic form it takes—all 
countries gain from the globally eficient move to mitigate. 
Put equivalently, growth with emissions is ineficient growth. 
The value of world output is not being maximized. The global 
social marginal beneit of GGE mitigation is the aggregate of 
beneits obtained in all countries since GGE reductions are a 
global public good. Thus it makes sense for these reductions 
globally to occur to the point where costs of mitigation equal 
this common aggregated beneit. Low mitigation cost  options 
should be cut back irst and higher cost options pursued 
 subsequently. Longer-term reduction efforts require an 80-
90 per cent eventual cut in emissions in developed countries 
and reduced growth in emissions prior to an eventual phase 
of emissions stabilisation in developing countries. Accompa-
nying such cuts with appropriate transfers ensures that the 
global eficiency gains are shared so all are better off. 
Carmody points out that increased revenues to developing 
countries will increase their ability to import from developed 
countries so developed countries have the opportunity to 
 export more. This boosts consumption and investment oppor-
tunities in developing countries and compensates them for the 
higher prices induced as a consequence of emissions control. 
Incomes in developed countries are lowered through the need 
to purchase permits. This restricts consumption and invest-
ment opportunities although these countries are more than 
compensated through reduced damages from climate change 
so that they too gain. This is not a dificulty but is exactly what 
is sought.
Nor does this analysis change if one country (call it China) 
sets emission targets for industry whereas other countries 
(e.g. the US) set the globally eficient carbon tax. The only 
 issue then is whether China sets targets that are consistent 
with those that, in conjunction with US measures, deliver 
 optimal global emissions levels. If it does then, while China 
may impose deadweight losses on itself by not mitigating at 
minimum cost, the same compensatory transfers need to 
be provided were it the case that both countries levied the 
 eficient tax.
Recognizing the possibility of obtaining eficient and  equitable 
outcomes does not mean that it is easy to come to device 
 global agreements which secure these outcomes. There are 
dificulties if incentive issues limit the willingness of individual 
nations to enter into such an agreement even if it is  collectively 
rational to do so. Such incentive issues limit the potential for 
unilateral commitments to such an agreement for ‘Tragedy of 
the Commons’ or ‘Prisoner’s Dilemma’ reasons1. 
The dificulties of achieving an international agreement to miti-
gate GGEs are based partly on possible competitiveness-driven 
carbon leakage losses to countries that unilaterally mitigate 
emissions and gains to countries to countries which do not2. 
Speciically agreement will be dificult to achieve if there are: 
• developing countries for whom the economic gains 
from not mitigating GGEs plus the carbon leakage gains 
 received (corresponding to the leakage losses incurred 
by countries which do mitigate) exceed the gains these 
countries would get from mitigating emissions and 
 perhaps receiving compensatory transfers; 
• developed countries for whom the gains generated from 
mitigation do not cover the costs of carbon leakages to 
developing countries (for discussion see Clarke, 2010) 
plus the costs of making compensatory transfers to 
 developing countries. 
1 The legitimate objection that eficient global trade in permits requires effective monitoring of emissions—so permits sold are not replaced by extra unrecorded 
 emissions—is a separate issue, albeit one that might compound other incentive concerns. All effective emission control policies rely on some monitoring technology.
2 Leakages can occur if exports or import-competing production in a country mitigating emissions cause cost disadvantages and economic losses with incentives for 
extra output of such products, increased emissions and economic advantage to countries which don’t mitigate (Reinhard 2009, Clarke 2010).
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I argue below that the problem of carbon leakages can be 
dealt with by appropriately deining the GGE base in terms 
of national consumption rather than production. Then, even 
 ignoring the issue of the willingness of developed countries to 
pay compensations, it can be argued that there remain strong 
arguments for unilateralist pursuit of mitigation. In short, the 
objections to unilateralism, when subject to scrutiny, are less 
persuasive than might be irst thought. 
There are three reasons for this:
First, with respect to ‘large’ countries (China, India, the 
 European Union, the United States, for whom GGEs in each 
country  comprise around 20 per cent of total GGEs,  individual 
country mitigation decisions provide some  direct climate 
 control beneits to the country that  mitigates. For example, 
 China’s mitigation of Chinese GGEs provides perceptible  climate 
control beneits to China. China contributed 55 per cent of the 
growth in world emissions from 2000-2005 and on a business 
as usual policy strategy will double its current emissions levels 
to nearly 40 per cent of global emissions from 2005-2030 (Gar-
naut et al. 2008). Developing countries and  China in particular 
will by their own actions substantially impact future rates of 
global warming. This is  particularly so because Chinese emis-
sions, by themselves, have a signiicant impact on Chinese wel-
fare and because of the substantial costs a country like China 
would face with unmitigated climate change, particularly with 
respect to water supply issues in rural areas.
Second, carbon control measures provide some ‘no  regrets’ 
beneits, unrelated to climate control, in countries which  incur 
local air pollution problems, such as SO2 pollution.  China, for 
example, has substantial air  pollution problems in its  major 
cities: it is claimed that 16 out of 20 of the world’s most 
 polluted cities are in  China. The World Bank has estimated 
the human and economic costs of this air pollution to be 
 substantial (World Bank 2007). To a large extent, the  pollution 
 relects increased atmospheric SO2 concentrations  associated 
with  burning coal for electricity  generation. The claimed costs 
of such pollution have proven  controversial but there is no 
question that there are substantial ‘no  regrets’  environmental 
beneits from GGE reductions that simultaneously reduce 
SO2  emissions. 
Third, for countries whose emissions signiicantly  impact 
on global GGEs there is a strong a priori case to address the 
prospects of catastrophic risk that impact on all countries. 
If a country implements a cost-beneit study to assess the 
case for mitigation and determines that, in at least one state 
of the world, there is the prospect of catastrophic climate 
change with non-negligible probability, then it makes sense to 
 address that concern without any attention at all to ‘free- rider’ 
strategic  policy complications or even such  controversial 
 issues as choice of discount rate (Clarke and Reed 2006). 
In short, unilateralism makes sense. There are compelling 
 arguments that the world is indeed faced with the prospects 
of catastrophic climate change with non-negligible probability. 
In widely- cited work, Weitzman (2009) has estimated a 5 per 
cent chance of warming of 10oC over the next 200 years if 
countries only gradually ramp-up their responses to  warming; 
with a 1 per cent probability there will be 20oC warming. These 
would be catastrophic events for all nations and the proba-
bilities are deinitely non-negligible, again implying a rational 
case for unilateralism. 
Thus, the argument that individually rational countries might 
‘opt out’ of a mutually advantageous global deal on climate 
control for reasons of perverse incentives is not  unambi guous. 
There is a case for unilateralism among large countries, even 
putting to one side the issue of compensations. With the 
 compensations that should be paid, on the practical basis 
that this secures a mutually advantageous global deal, this 
case becomes even stronger. In short, global environmental 
 agreements with respect to climate change should be stra-
tegically straightforward if countries accept the pessimistic 
implications of the mainstream science of climate change and 
understand the costs and beneits of active policy. As  Whalley 
and Walsh (2009) have argued, the ‘perception of  damages 
is critical to the concludability of negotiations’ (p.264). 
There  remains a task of communicating such information to 
 decision-makers.
3. InTEGRaTInG EnVIRonMEnTal  
obJECTIVES InTo TRaDE aGREEMEnTS
I concentrate on the case for using border tax adjustments 
(BTAs) as an auxiliary policy to national climate change 
 mitigation policies. These policies are of particular interest 
because, provided BTAs are levied as consumption taxes, 
they seem to be consistent both with the rules of the GATT 
( Tamiotti et al. 2009) and the objective of eliminating many 
carbon leakage issues. This latter feature assists in achieving 
international agreement on climate change mitigation. 
If carbon charges are computed on a consumption basis 
then exports of carbon-intensive goods would be exempt 
from charging but imports of carbon-intensive goods would 
be  subject to a BTA. This arrangement eliminates carbon 
 leakages associated with unfair competition from imports 
not subject to carbon charges and leaves exports competitive 
with foreign-produced goods in destination markets where 
charging does not occur. It also eliminates foreign capital 
lows that are purely based on seeking ‘pollution havens’ 
free from the impact of carbon charging. The only leakage 
issue not resolved by this choice of tax base is that due to 
the induced fall in the global prices of carbon-based fuels 
that will result from carbon-charging and hence  reduced 
 carbon-based fuel use in mitigating countries. These 
 reduced prices provide non-mitigating countries with incen-
tives to increase their carbon-based energy use and hence 
their  carbon  emission—a type of ‘general macroeconomic 
leakage’ (GML). 
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Taxing carbon emissions on a consumption basis in a world 
where not all countries levy the same carbon price is a  useful 
‘second-best’ prelude to the best policy of  uniform production-
based carbon taxes thart are universally  applied and which will 
internalise all externalities  including GML.  Indeed, countries 
which are net exporters of  carbon have incentives to switch 
from consumption-based to  production-based  charging to 
 access the tax revenues that would  otherwise  accrue to desti-
nation economies. Countries which do not  mitigate at all will 
not experience increased pressure to  mitigate on a consump-
tion basis as a consequence of  consumption-based  charging 
elsewhere since they will be subject to BTAs regardless. 
 However, in its favor, such a tax base means that countries 
which do seek to  mitigate intensively will not face real or 
 perceived  disincentives to do so on the basis of implied  carbon 
leakages. In short, the case for unilaterally moving toward 
 active mitigation strategies is enhanced. 
Many developing countries have reacted strongly to the 
 proposed use of BTAs. What is the rational basis for this 
 objection? On economic eficiency grounds no non- mitigating 
country has any reasonable basis for opposing correctly 
 imposed BTAs as an unjustiied restriction on world trade, 
provided such charges only internalize the external costs 
 associated with consumption in a nation. This means that 
the core issue is the possible misuse of BTAs by using them 
 illegitimately as a basis for a revival of protectionism. The 
best way to ensure that capture by protectionists does not 
occur is to ensure that the imposition of BTAs is subject to 
WTO  regulation and that these regulations are respected and 
agreed to in future global climate agreements. 
Otherwise there are ‘ambiguity’ reasons for fearing BTAs 
might be misused. A dificulty is the computation of the appro-
priate BTA when exporting countries apply non-price-based 
measures to control carbon emissions. Countries might 
 prefer publicly-supported, renewable technologies, invest-
ments in improved energy eficiency or direct controls on 
emissions rather than carbon charges. This means that the 
compensations negotiated cannot take the form of additional 
GGE  entitlements but must be taken as alternative income 
or technology transfer beneits. 
Even if, however, countries did apply uniform carbon  charges 
and exemption policies there remains the core issue of 
 computing BTAs when imports are produced using distinctive 
technologies, particularly when complex manufactures are 
 imported with components imported from a range of  countries. 
There are ambiguities in these areas that private  interest 
groups will seek to exploit to advance individually  rational 
though  ultimately destructive protectionist agendas. In fact 
carbon leakages are only of real concern in a handful of energy 
intensive industries that produce internationally traded goods 
where there is substantial product and process  uniformity—
certain steel mills, primary aluminium smelters, some chemi-
cal plants and cement and clinker kilns (Reinaud 2009, p.7).
Complexities involved in computing BTAs disappear if the 
threat of introducing them is enough to drive an international 
agreement that comes close to attacking carbon emissions 
on a production basis. This is presumably the intent of the 
 Waxman-Markey Bill3—at least in the form in which it was 
passed by the US House of Representatives—since it does not 
propose imposing BTAs until at least 2020 and then only on im-
ports from countries which are not very poor and which do not 
mitigate comparably with stated US intentions under this Bill. 
A particular practical focus is on the policies that should 
be adopted to derive trade strategies that relect embodied 
 carbon content. The issue is ‘carbon’ not ‘energy’ content 
since greenhouse externalities do not arise with non-carbon-
based power technologies. 
With a mix of trading countries that are thinking of miti-
gation and those who will not, production-based carbon 
 charges will, as argued in the previous section, induce 
 carbon  leakages, thereby reducing the unilateral incentive 
to  mitigate.  Consumption-based charging will prevent most 
of these  leakage effects from developing, hence providing 
 additional  impulse to unilaterally mitigate. 
Non-mitigating countries will enjoy extra consumption 
 beneits if other countries do not levy charges on their 
 carbon-based exports. Such non-mitigators will not face 
 extra incentives to mitigate on a consumption basis since 
BTAs will apply to their own exports regardless. They do 
face possible incentives to mitigate on a production basis 
to regain revenue that would otherwise accrue to mitigating 
destination countries for their own exports. Whether these 
incentives will be strong enough depends on the foregone 
energy consumption beneits they forego with such charging. 
4. fInal REMaRKS
The key issue confronting all nations is that GGEs must be 
cut. Developing nations such as China have low per capita 
energy consumption levels compared to the US but high 
 aggregate GGEs. They are also among the countries most 
likely to  experience severe costs of unmitigated climate 
change  because of the substantial dependence of their eco-
nomies on agriculture and looming water supply issues that 
climate change will aggravate. China is being dragged in two 
directions: it has a strong unilateral impulse to mitigate that 
is tempered by its development objectives.
The best initial basis for dealing with climate change is via 
a tax on a consumption basis with compensations sought 
from developed countries in terms of inancial aid, inance or 
 generous initial carbon emission quotas. Ultimately the world 
is best off with a uniform carbon price regime administered 
on a production basis. An initial step is to tax on a consump-
tion basis to help motivate a strong mitigation response by 
 developed countries. 
3 More accurately, this is the American Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009 passed by the US House of Representatives on June 26, 2009. It seeks to trim US GGEs by 
17 per cent over 2005 levels by 2020 and by 80 per cent by 2050, using a ‘cap-and-trade’ scheme. The Bill remains to be approved by the US Senate and is  subject to 
possible amendment there.
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